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1 Introduction
The Arab region is witnessing a general trend of
expanding security sectors to respond to
heightened security challenges, particularly the
spread of terrorist attacks. Countries that have
joined the ‘war on terror’ as designated by the
USA post-9/11 are finding that they can justify
measures in the name of fighting terror,
maintaining emergency laws or passing new,
more restrictive anti-terror laws. This trend is
not conducive to reforming security institutions,
downsizing them, increasing the transparency of
their operation or promoting democratic
practices within the sector.
At the same time, however, demands for political
reforms across the Arab region are increasing;
societies are awakening and have become more
vocal in claiming rights and pressing for
participation, even if they have not yet reached
an open debate about security sector reform
(SSR). Over the last two to three years, however,
some preliminary signs of movement on this
issue emerged within societies and seem to be
gaining momentum in several countries. Popular
criticism of the security sector is emerging,
mostly by human rights groups who use
independent media to expose various forms of
abusive behaviour by security agencies. The very
concept of security is only beginning to be
questioned, based on the perception that the
security sector does not deliver security to
citizens and is often a major source of threat to
them. Yet this does not go as far as formulating
propositions for reforming the sector. A home-
grown agenda for reform of the security sector
has yet to be defined.
Due to its sensitivity, there is little or no
discussion in the Arab countries on how to
promote good governance, transparency and
accountability of the security sector. Pressure
from below, i.e. from social groups, is either at an
embryonic stage or inexistent. The reasons are
complex: a general acceptance of the secrecy of
the security sector as a given, justified by the
very nature of its activities; the regional
environment and its risks; fear of domestic
instability due to a fragile social fabric or mere
fear of the unknown in general. Efforts towards
developing reform schemes have so far been
mostly initiated by international research
groups, donors and outside partners. While they
provide valuable suggestions and bring expertise
that can benefit Arab countries, they are mostly
built on approaches responding to the realities of
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other countries. More importantly, foreign-
driven efforts to reform the sector are inevitably
dependent on the cooperation of governments
and produce, at best, top-down measures of a
technical nature that do not challenge the
underlying rationale that governs the
functioning of the security sector.
To be effective, the approach requires a specific
effort to reassess what the notion of security
effectively covers: whose security is currently
being ensured and whose security should be
sought and guaranteed. The culture of ‘hard-
security’, shaped by the experiences of regional
or civil conflicts, remains dominant, as is the
vision of the role of the security sector as
guaranteeing national security and sovereignty,
rather than serving citizens and society’s needs.
This understanding of the content of security is
likely to evolve as political and social awareness
develops and societies make the link between the
democratic reform agenda and rights-based
approaches on the one hand and the security
agenda on the other.
This debate is now growing across the region.
International agencies are promoting the
concept of human security1 and societies are
awakening to the fact that their governments are
failing to guarantee their physical security (when
a natural catastrophe or accident occurs) and
their basic needs (water, food, etc).
2 Challenges to carrying out SSR in the Arab
region
To have a meaningful impact, an effective
process of reform of the security institutions of
Arab countries requires a solid understanding of
the geopolitics and political economy of the
security sector in the Arab region.
SSR working definitions must be comprehensive
and include: intelligence agencies, military
intelligence, police forces, the army in its
domestic role and praetorian guards (republican,
royal or presidential). These are by far the most
loyal and therefore reliable agencies that
guarantee the security of the political system.
The financing of these agencies, the way in
which they interact, their hierarchical chain and
who they report to, are all vital sources of
information on the internal mechanisms of the
security sector in each country and a necessary
starting point for any case study.
One major structural factor is the fact that the
security sector constitutes the backbone of Arab
political systems. Any discussion on reforming
this sector exposes the systems’ inner
vulnerability as well as their self-defence
mechanisms. The link between state institutions
and the regime apparatus tells us whether the
two are separable and therefore if the security
agencies as state institutions can be considered
‘reformable’ without threatening political
stability and national cohesion.
Many Arab countries have powerful state
machineries or what we could call mighty (as
opposed to strong) states that cannot be
described or approached as failed states. Algeria
and Iraq (before the overthrow of the Ba’ath
system) are two examples of regimes that relied
on the security sector to hold the country
together when other foundations of institutional
and societal cohesion were destroyed. The
pattern of Algeria’s recovery from war in the late
1990s indicates, however, that the regime still
had the capacity, after more than a decade of all-
out war, to reassert its control on the political
and security system and to re-invent itself
through an internal process that mobilised
national means and did not resort to outside
assistance.
Since inter-state conflicts are now rare and civil
strife is common, security sectors of Arab
countries have followed a general trend of
expanding security and intelligence agencies at
the expense of the military forces.
However, the interaction between the civilian
and the military spheres shows that the military,
whether professionalised or depoliticised, still
retains strong control over the political process
and remains the ultimate protector of the
regime. Yet security agencies, whether those
specialised in domestic security or the ones
dealing with external threats, have seen their
role and numbers grow tremendously over the
last decade, enhancing an increasingly complex
triangular relationship between the political,
military and security establishments.
Given the interaction between the political sphere
and the military-security sphere, a first distinction
needs to be made between the Arab countries
where political authority can be separated from
the military-security apparatus and where the
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security sector is the guardian of the interests of
the state on the one hand (Egypt, Morocco) and
countries where the security sector was built by
the ruling regime and whose raison d’être is to
protect the regime and the leaders’ interests
(Syria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria) on the other.
Algeria is one of the most significant examples of
a political and military-security system
symbiosis. Shaped by the 1957–62 independence
war, the symbiosis was reinforced by the 1991
coup and the ensuing bloody civil war during
which the army played a decisive role in
protecting the regime and ensuring its survival.
All attempts at reforming the Algerian security
sector in order to introduce the rule of law,
transparency and accountability, have so far
failed because they lead inevitably to questioning
the overall political structures of the state.
In Egypt, the numerous security agencies working
in parallel and under different chains of
command indicate the multi-layered structure of
the security sector. In Jordan, the intelligence
services are largely perceived as stronger than the
armed forces and security forces see themselves
as the guardians of national interests.
Algeria and Iraq provide useful examples of the
collapse or the protracted crisis of the security
sector. Scattered but abundant information is
available on both countries. Information on Iraq’s
security sector under Saddam Hussein, available
since the system was dismantled, is beginning to
provide critical information to understand the
precise mode of operation of a security sector
under an authoritarian regime.2 In Algeria, the
opacity of the security sector was broken, but the
sector was restructured, and survived. Historic
narratives on these two pivotal countries, which
have yet to be conducted, are likely to generate a
wealth of empirical information. The impact of
these two cases is traumatic in many respects for
perceptions within other Arab societies and
among reform activists concerned with the risks
involved in tackling security sector reform and
the lessons to be learnt.
A second factor relates to the current context of
instability, namely that the Arab region is the
epicentre of the ‘war on terror’. Reforming the
security sector in a context of rising threats of
terror on one side, and of rising strength of the
Islamist movements on the other, is having
important consequences that are still unfolding:
increase in the role of the security forces,
redefinition of security tasks and responsibilities,
concentration of intelligence information,
renewed equipments and increased budgets,
creation of security zones rendered inaccessible
to citizens (in Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Egypt).
If the security environment is not conducive to
improving transparency and democratic
accountability of the security sector, what is the
likelihood of an internal process strong enough
even within such an environment, to promote or
increase the role of civilian oversight bodies?
A third factor is related to the region’s relations
with outside powers. The security priorities and
military doctrines of major Arab countries affect
their readiness to conduct reform in cooperation
with outside powers. Levels of distrust vis-à-vis
foreign parties run high when it comes to the
security sector, either because the intervening
power is seen to promote its own interests, or
because of the foreign power’s alliance with and
support to the authoritarian regime against
society.
Contrary to Eastern Europe, reforms encouraged
from outside arouse deep suspicions in the
security community as well as within public
opinion. Few if any societies in the region aspire
to join a foreign military alliance, least of all
NATO, and no government, even if it saw
advantages in doing so, would consider it
politically feasible. Hence, when cooperation
exists, it is discreet or secretive and increases the
opacity of the sector.
Fourth, many Arab countries are rich. Oil-
producing countries in the Gulf region are not
dependent on development aid and have not
established relationships with donors that exist
for many developing countries. An approach that
seeks to address SSR as part of a broader
development agenda is not relevant.
Nevertheless, these states depend heavily on
military and security guarantees from outside
partners, and their security sectors are largely
structured to ensure close cooperation with them.
A fifth characteristic that applies to all countries
of the region without exception is the prevailing
culture of chauvinism and masculinity that
dominates the security sector and is an
inseparable component of authoritarianism.
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A conscious effort at engendering the process of
reform from the outset is needed to challenge
this culture. Without a strategy for gender-
sensitive reform, efforts at promoting a
democratic culture and a new understanding of
security will remain meaningless. Women have
unequal access to criminal justice systems; they
are the target of specific persecutions such as
honour crimes; they are subjected to specific
abuses and are often targeted by security sector
forces to destabilise opposition movements. The
rising tendency to cite religion and moral
integrity as a pretext to suppress citizens’
freedoms and violate privacy makes women the
central target for breaking a protest movement
and invariably has them paying a heavier price
than men.
Finally, an assessment of the political economy of
the security sector also informs on the way it
relates to the overall national context. The
security sector often has its own schools, colleges,
higher education and professional training
institutions as well as hospitals and social
services that give it a high degree of autonomy
and contribute to cultivating a specific culture of
security. To what extent this autonomy is an
obstacle to reforming the sector, and should it be
challenged in order to bring the security sector
closer to society, are open questions.
3 Sequencing of reforms: when is the right time
for SSR?
The timing and circumstances of SSR is crucial.
Should political change precede military/security
reforms or vice versa? Can they occur
simultaneously on all fronts or through different
phases, under emergency as a result of a crisis
situation or as part of an orderly negotiated
process? The most familiar model experienced in
other parts of the world is one in which some
significant political reform process occurs first
(free elections or a comprehensive governance
reform scheme driven from above); then second,
reform of the security sector is engineered by
accountable political authorities that gradually
impose civilian oversight over security agencies.
In some cases, however, when radical change
takes place and the nature of the political system
is transformed, the security sector is dismantled
at the same time as other institutions of the
authoritarian system. South Africa is arguably
one of the very few examples of radical yet
orderly change where change occurred in all
areas and across all state institutions
simultaneously.
In the Arab region, security sector reform is
occurring in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq but the
circumstances are very special in each case. All
have in common a powerful, outside – largely
negative – factor. The question that arises
becomes: Can SSR happen without a crisis to
trigger it, so that SSR constitutes a gradual
opening of the political system that will lead to
the breaking of the shell around the security
sector?
For now, examples of the latter are scarce.
Morocco seems to be the only promising
experience. It offers an encouraging example of
possible approaches to SSR at an advanced stage
in a gradual reform process. Two factors combined
to make this possible: (1) the legitimacy of the
monarchy in the eyes of Moroccans is very strong
and (2) civil and political society are vibrant and
fairly well-structured compared with other
countries of the region. The King (first Hassan II
in 1998, followed by his son Mohamed VI)
embarked on a process of change driven entirely
from above without raising issues over his own
political survival. In 1998, Hassan II initiated a
process of political change by appointing a
government led by the main opposition party and
set the terms of the overall process of reforms,
built on a joint understanding between the
monarchy and political forces that change by
consensus was the only way to achieve results.
Using the consensual approach, human rights
activists and other forces within civil society
started demanding concessions from the King
and have been able to make gradual but
significant progress over the last decade. The
King’s decision to create the Equity and
Reconciliation Commission in 2006 provides a
unique example among Arab countries of an SSR
process where civil society groups (human rights
organisations, lawyers, the media) are involved
as full players, which has led to questioning the
regime’s practices in an open and orderly way.
A second approach that has served as an effective
mechanism for addressing SSR concerns
investigations and trials for human rights
violations, which potentially unveil the
responsibilities as well as the operating mode of
the various agencies. This is only starting in
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Egypt, while in Morocco it has already led to
introducing a code of ethics for the army and the
security agencies.
Patterns of change – whether protest is coming
from below by sectors of society or is initiated
from above by the ruling establishment –
inevitably expose the security sector. In the first
model, it sets the security sector agencies on a
collision course with society. In the second, new
rules challenge the mode of operation and
established prerogatives of the security sector
representatives.
While SSR efforts should draw on experiences in
other regions to develop good understanding of
patterns and processes of reform, they must not
succumb to the temptation to depoliticise the
process. For although attempts to foster security
sector reform by aid agencies through a
depoliticised approach might receive the support
and a willingness to cooperate on the part of
certain governments, they run the risk of
becoming exercises in administrative and
technical reform, leading to mere modernisation
of the sector.
One of the important contributions that a
comparative dimension with other regions brings
is that it informs SSR efforts on the political
context in which reform of the security sector
was carried out in other countries. Also, it helps
define the appropriate approaches in different
contexts to tackle security sector reform: the
political considerations that lie behind the
distribution of power between the different
branches of the security sector and therefore the
political implications of reform, as well as the
likelihood that the regime will have the political
will to undertake reforms. A rights-based
approach that stems from efforts to change
public policies towards rule of law and the
involvement of human rights groups would also
help avoid the risk of a formal technical
approach. Parliaments and the judiciary, on the
other hand, are rarely in a position to play a
significant role in pushing for civilian oversight
of the security sector, as their powers tend to be
strongly limited by the executive branch.
Public distrust and feelings of estrangement vis-
à-vis the security sector have never been so
strong, particularly since social and political
protests have grown and increased the number of
clashes with security agencies. This trend is
likely to grow in countries where the government
is resisting change and responding to political
and social protest with security tools.
Several countries are seeing popular criticism of
the security sector: in Lebanon, where people
took to the street (the 14 March 2006
demonstration) to massively denounce the
intertwined Syrian/Lebanese intelligence
apparatus and its suspected role in the
assassination of the Prime Minister; in Palestine,
where mass demonstrations were more than
often directed against the corruption that
pervades the security agencies; in Egypt where
the media, thanks mainly to the use of mobile
phones to record evidence of mistreatments in
police stations, as well as the works of some film
producers, all taken up by human rights
organisations, have suddenly lifted the fear of
the security forces among growing sections of
society.
Yet Arab societies have always been ambivalent
towards the military and security agencies as a
whole. The ‘war on terror’ – the epicentre of
which is the Middle-Eastern region – contributed
to reviving profound feelings of insecurity at all
levels: individual, local, national, regional and
global. Arab citizens are at a loss on whether
they are the targets, the victims or the
beneficiaries of this war. Several regimes have
still not reached a sufficient level of awareness
that security alone does not bring stability, any
more than wealth can bring security to the oil-
producing states of the Gulf. Additionally, the
absence of political and civil liberties, as well as
respect for human rights and state
accountability, is leading to the rise of extremism
and to signs of societal fragmentation.
Another major challenge to SSR in some Arab
countries is in cases where the regime relies
heavily on the security sector to structure social
and political relations and guarantee national
stability. These regimes combine a powerful
security apparatus with the potential for social
disintegration that is characteristic of failed
states. At different levels, Sudan, Iraq, and to a
lesser extent Syria, are the most vulnerable Arab
states in terms of risks of national and territorial
fragmentation, a scenario which could ultimately
lead to the disintegration and the privatisation of
the security sector.
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4 Private interests, privatisation or
fragmentation of the security sector
Privatisation of the security sector is a rapidly
growing phenomenon and is rendering SSR more
complex as it is not solely a state-controlled
process any more. On the contrary, in many
countries, regimes and societies alike seem to
rely increasingly on security-provider substitutes
to state institutions and agencies, when these are
considered inefficient, weak or unreliable.
Conversely, in others, the once powerful state
security apparatus, and especially the military,
are mainly concerned with promoting their
private interests. This process of privatisation of
security follows three specific patterns, all of
which are potential obstacles to reforms.
The privatisation of the security sector through
financial means is occurring at a speedy pace in
the wealthy Gulf Arab countries (Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates) where the regime’s sense
of vulnerability in terms of internal and external
threats runs deep. It largely explains the leaders’
reluctance to build strong armies and their use
of financial power as a way to both control the
security agencies and ensure their unconditional
loyalty (recruiting army mercenaries, hiring
private security agencies, funding paramilitary
Islamic activist groups, etc.) In this perspective,
the privatisation of the security sector is a state-
engineered self-defence strategy.
A second more challenging trend is the
emergence of sub-national forces and the
different forms of fragmentation of the security
sector. In Lebanon, Sudan and Yemen, the
security sector is privatised as a result of its links
with sub-national groups and its entanglement
with factional, tribal and sectarian dynamics.
Where the feelings of instability and insecurity
have grown, the populations have come to rely on
tribes, militias, families, local neighbourhoods
and informal armed gangs to ensure physical as
well as social and economic security as a
substitute to central authority. Yemen is the
most telling example of the process of the
‘tribalisation’ of security in Arab societies. In
other instances, governments themselves are
resorting to gangs and concluding agreements
with them (which are usually kept secret,
although they are sometimes revealed by the
independent press), entrusting these groups with
the security of remote regions of the country to
allow the state security forces to concentrate on
areas that are considered more strategic for the
survival of the regime.
Among sub-national groups, Hezbollah in
Lebanon may be considered an exception, given
the fragility of the country’s state and security
institutions and the vulnerability of its multi-
sectarian national fabric to external pressures.
Yet Hezbollah’s audience, which has grown
beyond the Shi’a community, has more to do with
the organisation’s role as a ‘security provider’
due broadly to its extensive network of social
services than to its regional prestige as a
resistance movement against Israeli occupation.
Yemen and Lebanon share in common that the
state, due to its endemic weakness and lack of a
strong coercive security sector, plays the role of a
mediator between – or negotiating partner with
– tribes or sectarian groups. The Sudanese case
is different, largely because of the rebellion in
the south and of the Darfur conflict, which
reflect the failure of the Northern central power
to achieving nation-building through the use of
military force.
Privatisation takes on a third pattern in Egypt,
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, where the army
remains the backbone of the regimes but has
been sidelined by a multi-tentacled, domestic
security apparatus. In all these instances, the
army is increasingly involved in industrial and
commercial activities as a form of compensation
for its forced disengagement from the political
process. The depoliticisation process has led to
stronger professionalism of the military, but it
has yielded a huge private economic sector owned
by the armed forces and sponsored by the state.
The most telling example is Egypt, where the
army controls a large industrial and contracting
sector and where the promotion of its own private
interests has led some intelligence agencies to
emerge at the forefront in negotiating contracts
with foreign investors. In Morocco, a security
market has developed where different private
actors and security agents conclude deals, with
the blessing of the government.
5 Promoting the rule of law
In all Arab countries, the lack of transparency
and accountability of the security sector is
maintained by the constitutional and
institutional ambiguities with regard to the
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distribution of power between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches. Due to the
weakness or absence of established rules and
mechanisms and bodies to enforce them, civilian
bodies lack the tools to hold the security sector
accountable.
Palestine is a case in point, where institutional
and constitutional flaws partly explain the
failure to promote good governance and rule of
law ever since the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority (PA), as well as the
structural imbalance between an all-powerful
executive branch monopolising the security
sector and the legislative and judicial branches.
The Palestinian security sector grew in a context
of national resistance followed by a project of
nation-building; its members were militants and
activists rehabilitated through the security
institutions. The levels of corruption within them
are the highest among Palestinian public
institutions. This highlights the importance of a
balanced distribution of power in controlling the
security sector among the three branches of
government and of engaging civil society in order
to reduce the abusive interferences of security
institutions in every realm of life. The failure to
separate the security sector from factional
militias is arguably the most important factor
that led to the current division of Palestinian
society and polity and to a civil strife.
6 Is there a useful role to play for outside
parties?
There is a paradox in the attitude of states when
it comes to their security sector. While they
consider their military and security agencies as
the strongholds of state sovereignty to which
external parties should have no access and no
say, it is probably in the field of security that they
are most open to cooperation, exchange of
intelligence and joining efforts with other
countries whenever their own security is
threatened. The result is that public opinion is
particularly hostile to outside interferences in
the security sector while governments, especially
when they are cooperating with unpopular
partners, need to do so discreetly.
On the other hand, outside partners,
governments or international organisations often
fail to coordinate their policies of aid and
promotion of good governance in Arab countries
in order to strengthen their coherence. For
example, the World Bank, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) are seeking to promote
governance practices that the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and other security
cooperation frameworks might well be
weakening through their support of other
reforms that produce the opposite effects. The
region is experiencing tensions in its relations
with outside parties on the one hand responding
to requirements that are designed to enhance
local capacities to confront security threats
(terrorism, illegal migration, money laundering)
and on the other measures designed to promote
democratic rules and practices within the
security sector.
In this context, can outside parties provide a real
impetus to reform processes? Can the role of
outside parties be more than technical?3 Can
they contribute to enhancing existing political
openings?
A host of SSR programmes have been initiated in
the region, targeting countries in post-conflict
situations, such as Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and
Sudan. In these instances, the reform agenda is
primarily designed to respond to regional
security concerns rather than to domestic
considerations, such as accompanying processes
of democratisation. They fail to engage key
actors outside the security sector and
government that are struggling to push forward
a democratic agenda. They play a useful role in
setting norms of behaviour, but they fall short of
inducing genuine momentum within society
without which a transformation of the security
sector practices seems unlikely.
Attempts at pressing for security sector reform
from within, as in the cases of Morocco, Egypt or
Yemen, have thus far been disconnected from the
efforts of outside parties. These attempts are
initiated by human rights organisations,
democracy activists, social and professional
unions and movements and often include former
members of the security sector. Their strategies
are woven into the overall struggle for civil
liberties, rule of law, mobilisation against
torture, access to information, budget
transparency and popular protests on various
issues that affect the human security and dignity
of citizens. These voices are shaping the
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discussion and helping to redefine the question
of whose security should be sought and what the
security sector’s primary mission ought to be, in
more relevant ways than outside parties, local
elites or representatives of the security
institutions themselves are able or willing to
articulate, thus setting the ground for a home-
grown process of reform of the security sector.
Yet, while the most likely scenario for SSR in Arab
countries is one where the decisive impulse will be
domestic, external contributions are essential in
sustaining the process. Arab societies are looking
at other experiments to learn from. More than
Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America
appears to offer relevant lessons. In Latin
American countries that experienced democratic
transition, it is clear that external support
contributed significantly to successful reform of
the security sector, though in very different ways.
Hence, the question is not whether or not outside
involvement is needed, but rather how this
external contribution can be designed in a way
that contributes to and increases the efficiency of
domestically engineered reform.
7 Conclusion
SSR is undoubtedly the one area where
governments’ resistance to reform is likely to be
strongest, thus raising in the most acute manner
the question of whether reform driven from
outside through assistance to governments can
succeed and be sustained when the political will
is lacking.
For meaningful reform of the security sector to
take place in the region, a number of conceptual
and practical aspects need to be addressed, first
among which are the modalities of exit from
authoritarianism that must accompany efforts to
conduct SSR in the region. The answer is likely
to vary from one country to another. Yet it seems
clear that the most effective way to promote
reform of the security sector is through
embedding it in the larger struggle for
democratic change that civil and political society
is pushing for.
The security sector is not a monolith. Like other
government institutions, it is possible to reach
out to reform-minded individuals within it to
advance the reform agenda. More importantly,
members of security institutions (particularly
ministries of interior and those structures in
charge of keeping law and order and are in direct
contact with the population) have become keen
to promote a better image of their institutions
and how they relate to society. Egypt is a case in
point, where representatives of the sector are
becoming resentful of being portrayed as ‘the
ugly face of the state’ and feel they are the target
of public anger because they are the executing
arm of an authoritarian and repressive regime.
This is leading some of its representatives to
engage with civil society groups and to cooperate
in investigations on mistreatment of detainees
and human rights violations.
Public debate on the security sector, which was
taboo only two years ago, is developing rapidly in
Arab countries. The participation of
representatives from civil society organisations,
the role of the media, initiatives by members of
special commissions such as the Equity and
Reconciliation Commission in Morocco, groups
working on memory and reconciliation in
Lebanon and Algeria, human rights
organisations in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and
advocacy groups promoting rule of law and
transparency, are critical. Informal dialogues
among civil society groups and attempts at
engaging representatives from the security
sector are shaping a bottom-up process to
formulate a citizens’ agenda of reform that
seems more promising than formal programmes
of reform that rely on state institutions.
The process by which civil society sets the agenda
is by definition largely spontaneous, messy, and
based on ‘trial and error’. It is shaped by clashes
with security forces, scandals concerning the
mistreatment of detainees in prisons, and
revelations by the media of all sorts of abuses. It
differs from one country to another depending
on the priority concerns of the society. In Jordan
for example, there exists a focus on the rule of
law and on the protection of women due to the
widespread practice of honor crimes.
While historical, institutional and international
factors are all working against changing the
status quo or promoting the rule of law, the real
promising avenue for change seems to come
from local civil society actors. Where civil society
has had some space to grow, it is gradually
developing effective strategies to challenge the
security apparatus. This more hopeful pattern
exists in Egypt, Morocco, Yemen, Lebanon and
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Palestine (the latter being the case where civil
society is probably stronger than in any other
Arab society). It is nascent in Jordan and
remains absent in Syria or Tunisia. In spite of the
narrow space for expression, let alone
participation, the civil rights movements in Arab
countries have been more successful at setting
the agenda than the traditional legal-
bureaucratic-institutional approaches advocated
by bilateral and international donors.
Kodmani and Chartouni-Dubarry The Security Sector in Arab Countries: Can it be Reformed?104
Notes
1 Human security is the chosen theme of the
upcoming Arab Human Development
Report(UNDP, forthcoming).
2 An ‘autopsy’ of the Iraqi security sector under
the Ba’ath regime and another on Algeria are
under way as part of a comparative research
project on security sector reform in the Arab
world conducted by the Arab Reform
Initiative during 2008–10.
3 See Sayigh (2007) for a comprehensive review
of the issues and challenges facing SSR in the
Arab world.
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